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Current Army models and simulations provide limited representation of the 
actions and behaviors of the individual combatant (Soldier, Sailor, Marine, or 
Airman).  As the Army transforms into the Future Force, more emphasis is being 
placed on modeling the actions and behaviors of the individual combatant.  The 
Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center – Monterey has initiated the 
Individual Combatant Research Project.  One important research area is 
modeling how individual entities react to indirect fire, which is the focus of this 
thesis. 
From a study of both historical examples and current U.S. Army doctrine, 
we derived the input factors and responses. We selected the most significant 
input factors and derived a general model to represent this combat phenomenon.  
We identified four of the most important input factors: training status, experience 
under fire, protective posture, and distance from the impact.  Each of these four 
factors has two levels resulting in sixteen different cases.  Using estimated 
values based on our military judgment we devised a probability matrix that 
depicts the probability of a response given a particular case.  We identified four 
of the most likely initial individual responses: continue with the mission, run away 
from the impact, assume a more protective posture, and suffer temporary 
paralysis.  In summary, the approach we used was to select the most significant 
factors and the most likely reactions, and then assign a probability of occurrence 
to each reaction base on a specific combination of factors. 
From the general model we derived a specific model that we implemented 
as a behavior rule in the Combined Arms Analysis Tool for the 21st Century, 
CXXI.  We determined that we could not incorporate all of the many factors that 
contribute to an individual's reaction to indirect fire. The primary reason is that 
CXXI, while still in the development stages, is currently not capable of modeling 
many of the factors we have identified as contributing to an individual's reaction.  
 xviii
With these limitations identified, we focused our effort on the two most significant 
factors that could be modeled in CXXI.  These factors are protective posture and 
perceived proximity to the impact.  Figure 5 is a graphic representation of the 
algorithm we implemented in CXXI. 
Figure 5. Flow Chart of Algorithm 
We developed a scenario in CXXI that allowed us to test our algorithm and 
analyze the results.  We executed a total of thirty runs and used Minitab for our 
analysis tool.  Our data analysis consisted of a two-sample t-test, a Mann-
Whitney test, and a two-way analysis of variance.  We concluded that the 
difference in the mean number of kills between the base case with no "react to 
indirect fire" behavior and the alternative case with the behavior in place was 
both statistically and militarily significant. 
Through the method of face validation, we determined that our model met 
the requirements for validity.  The implementation of our model in CXXI is an 
improvement that has made CXXI more realistic and functional.  
 
 






















Modeling combat phenomena is a complex undertaking.  Soldiers under 
fire who may be cold, wet, tired, and scared react to situations differently based 
on a great number of factors.  Modeling how an individual soldier reacts to 
indirect fire is a difficult undertaking.  Take for instance this quote from a 
commander in the Israeli Army during the Yom-Kippur War responding to his 
ability to perform his duties while under indirect fire: 
Thinking is impaired, one turns into a robot, you find yourself 
in a situation of traumatic anxiety and are unable to 
think…There were only a few brief moments when thought was 
outside the boundary of automatic response…In shelling, it is 
important that the noise not succeed in silencing the fragile 
voice of thought. [Ref 13] 
 
Current Army models and simulations (M&S) provide limited 
representation of the actions and behaviors of the individual combatant (Soldier, 
Sailor, Marine, or Airman).  As the Army transforms into the Future Force, more 
emphasis is being placed on modeling the actions and behaviors of the individual 
combatant (IC).  General Kevin Brynes, Commander of the US Army Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) stated:  
Iraq and Afghanistan have showed us again that it is the 
caliber of the soldier not the caliber of the weapon that makes 
the difference in the battle.  As such, the Soldier as a System 
(SaaS) is being given top priority in order to support Army 
Transformation goals and objectives. [Ref 16] 
 
One important area of interest is modeling how individual combatants 
react to indirect fire, which is the focus of this thesis.  This thesis develops an 
algorithm to represent the individual combatant's reaction to indirect fire.  This 
algorithm is implemented in a high-resolution combat simulation and analysis is 




In an effort to meet these goals, the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) Analysis Center – Monterey has initiated the Individual Combatant 
Research Project.  One important research area is modeling how individual 
entities react to indirect fire.  The suggested approach is to develop a model to 
represent this behavior.  The desired end state would be a reusable product for 
integration into current and emerging simulations, such as the Combined Arms 
Analysis Tool for the 21st Century (CXXI). 
CXXI is a high-resolution, closed-form, stochastic, analytical combat 
simulation.  It is being developed by the TRADOC Analysis Center – White 
Sands Missile Range (TRAC-WSMR) and the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC).  CXXI is a replacement for the Combined 
Arms and Task Force Evaluation Model (CASTFOREM). [Ref 5] 
TRAC-WSMR has identified a need to develop a react-to-indirect-fire 
capability in CXXI.  This reaction to indirect fire can be implemented in the 
simulation using a set of behavior rules.  The purpose of this analysis is to 
develop a general model that depicts how an individual entity reacts to indirect 
fire, and then implement a version of that model in CXXI using a set of behavior 
rules. 
B. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The reaction of individual combatants to indirect fire is a vague topic.  We 
scoped the problem down to the essential elements and bounded the problem 
dimensions into four areas: doctrinal study of input factors, historical study of 
input factors, a general model derived from these two studies, and the 
implementation of a specific model in CXXI. 
1. Doctrinal Study of Input Factors 
The Reaction to Indirect fire is a combination of immediate actions taken 
by individuals and teams without orders from superiors and subsequent unit 
actions that are rapidly planned and executed. [Ref 12]  With this in mind, our 
doctrinal study is divided into two areas: individual reactions and leader 
reactions.  In studying an individual's reaction, it is expected that his behavior 
3 
factors, such as personality, experience, training, and exposure will have a direct 
effect on his reaction to indirect fire.  In terms of leader reaction, the type of 
mission a unit is conducting is one factor that will effect how the leader reacts 
and thus effect how all the individuals in his unit react to indirect fire. 
2. Historical Study of Input Factors 
We examined several historical examples from different conflicts to 
determine the most significant input factors.  We specifically examined the 
Somme Offensive of July 1916 and the bombardment of the Bar-Lev Line on the 
outbreak of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  From our examination of these battles 
we were able to identify some of the important historical input factors. 
3. A General Model 
Considering the many factors that effect an individual's reaction, we 
developed a general model for this behavior.  The approach we used was to 
select the most significant factors and the most likely reactions, and then assign 
a probability of occurrence to each reaction base on a specific combination of 
factors.  These probabilities are subjective estimates.  When possible the 
estimates are justified with data from historical studies.  If deemed critical, these 
estimates could be substantiated from data gathered from actual combat studies. 
4. Implementing the Behavior in COMBAT XXI 
From the general model, we developed a specific behavior model that is 
appropriately matched to the current capabilities of CXXI.  CXXI is a high-
resolution simulation and is capable of providing a detailed reaction.  Even with 
this state-of-the-art simulation, it cannot completely model every detail of this 
combat action, nor would that be necessarily beneficial.  With this in mind, the 
general model was tailored to match the particular capabilities and limitations of 
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II. DOCTRINAL STUDY OF INPUT FACTORS 
The reaction to indirect fire is a combination of immediate actions taken by 
individuals and teams without orders from superiors and subsequent unit actions 
that are rapidly planned and executed. [Ref 12]  With this in mind, our doctrinal 
study is divided into two areas: individual reactions and leader reactions. 
A. INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS 
To best understand the reaction to indirect fire, we begin with a doctrinal 
study to answer the question “how are soldiers trained to react to indirect fire?”  
The primary document to answer this question is the Soldiers Manual of 
Common Tasks for Skill Level 1 [Ref 10].  This manual breaks down the task into 
a set of conditions and standards with performance steps as shown in Figure 1. 
[Ref 10] 
Conditions: 
You are a member (without leadership responsibilities) of a squad or team. You 
are either in a defensive position or moving on foot.  You hear incoming 




React to each situation by shouting “incoming,” following the leader’s directions if 
available, and taking or maintaining cover.  
 
Performance Steps: 
Shout “incoming” in a loud, easily recognizable voice. 
Look to you leader for additional instructions. 
Remain in your defensive position (if appropriate); making no unnecessary 
movements that could alert the enemy to your location. 
Take cover outside of the impact area (if you are in an exposed position or 
moving), keeping the body low if the leader is not in sight. 
 
Figure 1.   Task Conditions, Standards, and Performance Steps 
 
Further exploration of doctrinal publications led us to categorize the 
factors into three areas: factors related to the conditions of combat, factors 
related to the soldiers task, and physiological factors.  Below are some of the 
factors that may influence how an individual reacts to indirect fire. [Ref 6] 
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1. Factors Related to the Conditions of Combat 
a. Protective Posture 
The protective posture of the individual is one of the most 
significant factors.  There are several methods to classify protective posture.  
One commonly used method is to classify a vehicular entity into one of the 
following categories: fully exposed, hull defilade (only the turret is exposed), and 
turret defilade.  For an individual soldier the categories could be: standing, 
kneeling, prone, hasty fighting position, and standard fighting position with 
overhead cover. 
b. Intensity of Fire 
The intensity of fire is also a factor.  The reaction to a heavy 
bombardment of large caliber rounds may be drastically different from the 
reaction to harassing fire from a small caliber mortar. 
c. Unpredictability of Fire 
Indirect fire can be delivered on a predictable schedule or at 
random.  The more unpredictable the fire the more effective it may be.  
d. Leadership Failure 
Leadership is a key factor in determining how soldiers perform 
under fire.  A leadership failure, or even a perceived leadership failure can 
directly effect how a soldier reacts to indirect fire.  The following historical 
anecdote illustrates the effects of this factor: 
In 1918, in the face of light indirect fire, an American infantry 
battalion serving as a regimental reserve broke and ran.  The 
battalion commander was inspecting his positions when he 
was told to report to the regimental command post.  Within 
earshot of his troops, he told his adjutant, "Come on, let's beat 
it," and began to run toward the CP and away from the enemy.  
The commander's men misinterpreted his words and actions 
as cowardice and panicked.  Within a minute the battalion had 
passed the commander and ran for almost six miles before 




e. Death or Replacement of the Leader 
Similar to a leadership failure, the death of a leader can so 
demoralize the soldiers that they fail to do what they are trained to do and 
instead break and run.  When a leader is replaced, the new leader may not yet 
have earned the trust of his subordinates.  As a result, the soldiers under indirect 
fire may not follow the orders of the new leader. 
f. Lack of Information 
A soldier without information may think the worst of a situation.  For 
example, a soldier receiving indirect fire and without information about his 
adjacent units may be more likely to leave his position than a soldier that is in 
continuous contact with his adjacent units and knows that they are holding their 
positions. 
2. Factors Related to the Soldier's Task 
a. Level of Military Training 
Highly trained units know how to react to indirect fire.  Their 
reaction is a battle drill, an action taken almost without thought.  Untrained 
soldiers my freeze under fire. 
b. Isolation from the Unit 
The less isolated a soldier is from his unit, the more likely he is to 
take the correct action under indirect fire. 
c. Near Misses 
A near miss may cause a soldier to react in a unique way, possibly 
resulting in temporarily debilitation.  The following anecdote illustrates how even 
a highly trained and proven small unit leader with two years of combat 
experience may react to indirect fire that is a near miss. 
Shells from the mortars began coming in.  Several landed near 
him, one very close.  But he was only stunned, not hit.  He 
managed to continue the fighting… but became tremulous and 
unable to hold his rifle.  [Ref 6] 
This platoon sergeant with the 1st Division in Tunisia was 
evacuated to the aid station and returned to his platoon after two days. 
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d. Passive Role 
A soldier that is in a passive role, such as a truck driver or 
technician, may react differently than a soldier that is in a more active role, such 
as a rifleman.  The soldier in a passive role may be less mentally prepared for an 
attack than the soldier in an active role, which could affect his response. 
e. Experience Under Fire 
As a soldier gains more experience under fire his ability to assess 
the situation and react appropriately increases to a certain point.  With indirect 
fire, continuous unrelenting fire, while increasing the soldier's experience, will 
eventually degrade his ability to react appropriately. 
3. Physiological Factors 
a. Food or Water Deprivation 
Lack of food or water can effect how a soldier reacts to indirect fire.  
Lack of these essentials in effect, decreases a soldier combat effectiveness and 
as a result he may not react appropriately to indirect fire. 
b. Exhaustion 
Napoleon said it best in that "fatigue makes cowards of us all."  A 
truly exhausted soldier does not have the strength to react appropriately to 
indirect fire. 
c. Day or Night 
There is historical evidence that shows that indirect fire weapons 
will cause greater fear if employed at night and this may effect how a soldier 
reacts.  The fact that it is night may affect a soldiers reaction based on the night 
vision equipment he has.  For example, a soldier with a night vision device may 
be more likely to move away form the impact than a soldier without a night vision 
device. [Ref 9] 
4.  Most Significant Factors 
From this list of factors, we selected the four factors that appeared to be 
the most significant and most capable of being modeled.  Our approach is 
general enough to accommodate additional factors.  The four factors are: 
protective posture, distance from impact, level of training, and experience under 
9 
fire.  The four initial individual responses to indirect fire are: continue with the 
mission, assume a more protected posture, flee from the impact area, or 
paralysis. 
 
B. LEADER REACTIONS 
The leader's reaction to indirect fire is highly dependent upon a number of 
situational factors.  While certainly not an all-inclusive list, here are some of the 
significant factors that effect a leaders decision as to how he will direct his unit to 
react to indirect fire [Ref 12]: 
· Unit’s current mission 
· Current protective posture 
· Restriction in the operational environment 
· What effect the indirect fire is actually having 
· Mission of adjacent and supporting units 
· The quality and quantity of the fire 
1. Unit’s Current Mission 
The leader must consider his current mission and the relative importance 
of maintaining his unit’s position, direction of movement, or rate of advance.  For 
example, if a unit is defending a decisive piece of terrain, the unit leader may 
decide that holding his unit's position despite receiving indirect fire is the best 
course of action. 
2. Current Protective Posture 
The leader must consider his unit’s current protective posture.  There are 
several methods to classify protective posture.  As discussed earlier, one 
commonly used method is to classify a vehicular entity into one of the following 
categories: fully exposed, hull defilade (only the turret is exposed), and turret 
defilade.  For an individual soldier the categories could be: standing, kneeling, 
prone, hasty fighting position, and standard fighting position with overhead cover. 
3. Restriction in Operational Environment 
The leader must consider the restrictions in the operational environment to 
include the rules of engagement, restrictive fire areas, and no fire areas.  The 
10 
rules of engagement are defined as the directives issued by competent military 
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United 
States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 
encountered. [Ref 13]  Restrictive fire areas are areas in which specific 
restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions will 
not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters.  No fire 
areas are areas designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or 
their effects are prohibited. [Ref 13] 
4. Effects of the Indirect Fire 
The leader must consider what effect the indirect fire is having on this unit.  
The leader must determine if the indirect fire is producing significant casualties 
and damage.  The leader should also determine if the indirect fire is only 
harassing fire. 
5. Mission of Adjacent and Supporting Units 
The leader must consider the mission of adjacent and supporting units.  
He should consider whether those units are in a position to support his unit or 
not.  Positions and current control measures may restrict the leader's potential 
reactions.  Boundaries may restrict his movement and the positions of friendly 
units may restrict his use of counter-fire. 
6. The Quality and Quantity of the Fire 
The leader must consider the quality and quantity of the fire his unit is 
receiving.  He should consider how close the rounds are impacting and whether 
the rounds appear to be directed or adjusted by an observer.  He should consider 
the volume and duration of the fire and categorize it as heavy, continuous, light, 
or sporadic.  The type of weapons system firing, mortar or artillery, and the 
caliber, light, medium, or heavy, is also a consideration. [Ref 12] 
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III. HISTORICAL STUDY 
We examined several historical examples from different conflicts to 
determine how soldiers have historically reacted to indirect fire and what were 
the most significant input factors.  We examined the Somme Offensive of 1916 
and the bombardment of the Bar-Lev Line during the start of the Yom Kippur War 
of 1973.  From our examination of these battles we were able to identify some of 
the historical input factors and reactions. 
A. SOMME OFFENSIVE 
In July of 1916, British and French forces launched the Somme Offensive. 
[Ref 6]  The general concept of the battle was to launch a massive artillery 
bombardment of the German positions lasting five days.  The ground attack on 
the fifth day would be synchronized with close artillery support of the advance.  
Some estimates say that within the first few kilometer of the German sector "each 
2500 square yards had received a ton of shells…and each 1000 square yards 
had received 30 shells. [Ref 6] 
Despite this massive bombardment by the British and French, the 
Germans reaction was to maintain their positions and successfully defend their 
sector.  Combined casualties for the British and French were 620,000 while the 
Germans had 450,000.  Although the artillery was massive, it did not achieve 
massive effects at the decisive point on the battlefield. [Ref 6] 
There are several factors that may have influenced German reaction to 
the indirect fire.  For one, the artillery became predictable.  Additionally, the 
Germans knew when to expect the indirect fire and took cover.  The intensity of 
fire lessened at night.  The Germans were able to predict the start of the ground 
attack and communicate that down to the squad level.  The most significant 
factor was the artillery observer's inability to synchronize the creeping barrage to 
support the infantry ground attack.  The Germans were able to stay in their 
covered position until the indirect fire stopped with time to reposition and 
effectively engage the attacking infantry.  These are some of the more evident 
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factors that influenced the German reaction to indirect fire during this battle. [Ref 
6] 
B. BAR-LEV LINE 
Israeli forces suffered under a massive bombardment along the Suez 
Canal (the Bar-Lev Line) at the start of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  This 
bombardment was the Egyptian application of the Soviet doctrine of "artillery 
shock" in which over 10,000 shells were fired in the first minute.  The aim of this 
massive bombardment was to temporarily neutralize the enemy's ability to react. 
[Ref 17] 
The Israeli Institute for Military Studies conducted a study in 1992 that 
examined the psychological effects of intense artillery bombardment.  This study 
was useful in identifying both input factors and reactions. [Ref 17]  The study 
divided the input factors into three areas: 
· Battlefield factors: surprise, intensity, duration, combination with 
ground attack, and severity of loss. 
· Unit factors: combat readiness, presence of senior leadership, 
morale, cohesion, and duration in bunker. 
· Individual factors: combat experience, level of training, rank, 
education level. 
The study examined the combatants' responses to indirect fire.  The 
responses were categorized by: physiological, emotional, and cognitive.  The two 
most common physiological responses were heartthrobs and dryness of mouth.  
The following is an except from a combatant questionnaire: 
Due to the shelling, I went into shock…dryness in the mouth 
was extremely pronounced and I sharply remember this right 
up to today.  My entire body hurt from the strain of the 
muscles at the time I took shelter from the shells, and I 
remember that it was only with great difficulty that I succeeded 
in swallowing some food at the time of the break in the 
shelling. [Ref 13] 
The five most frequent emotional responses were: self-confidence, helplessness, 
excitement, anger, and fear.  The study found that the differences in emotional 
responses were linked to the factors of type of service (conscript or reserve), 
rank, and location of the combatant at the time of the shelling. [Ref 17]  The most 
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frequent cognitive responses were "sharpness of thought" and "focusing on one 
thought" [Ref 17] 
They also examined the influence the indirect fire had on the functioning of 
the combatants.  Most soldiers reported that functioning decreased at first and 
then improved.  Four percent of the soldiers reported suffering from temporary 
paralysis (they lost the ability to move) as a result of the indirect fire. [Ref 17] 
The study concluded that the factors that distinguished highly-functioning 
soldiers from poorly-functioning ones were personal characteristics (character, 
personality), combat experience, level of training, role as a leader, and the type 
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IV. GENERAL MODEL 
From the doctrinal and historical studies, we were able to identify many 
factors that affect how both individuals and leaders react to indirect fire.  From 
these, we identified the most significant factors and developed a general model 
to represent this phenomenon. 
A. INDIVIDUAL REACTION 
Figure 2 shows the basic structure that we used to present the model in its 
most general form for the individual entity. 
Model for Individual Reaction
Training























Figure 2.   Individual Reaction to Indirect Fire. 
 
We selected the input factors in Figure 2 based on our doctrinal study, 
historical study, and professional experiences.  Essentially, we chose the four 
most significant factors and the four most realistic and historically documented 
reactions.  We chose these factors for their importance and for their ability to be 
modeled.  Each factor has two levels.  The factors are: protective posture, 
distance from impact, level of training, and experience under fire.  The four initial 
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individual responses to indirect fire are: continue the mission, assume a more 
protected posture, run away from the impact area, and paralysis. 
With four factors, each with two levels, there are sixteen different cases.  
The matrix in Figure 3 represents each of the sixteen different cases and the 
associated probability of a response given a particular case.  For example, the 
entity that falls under case seven is trained, experienced under fire, is not in a 
protective posture, and is within the effective distance of the impact.  This entity 
has a five percent probability of continuing the mission, a five percent probability 
or running away from the impact area, and a ninety percent probability of 
assuming a more protected posture.  We devised this matrix using estimated 
values based on our military judgment.  These are estimates that can be updated 
with actual values derived from future combat studies. 
Figure 3.   Probabilities for Each Case 
 
B. LEADER REACTION 
We selected the input factors and reactions for the leader, as seen in 
Figure 4, based on our doctrinal study, historical study, and professional military 
experiences.  The fundamental decision the leader must make when reacting to 
indirect fire is whether to keep his unit in position or to move.  As the focus of this 
 The table below shows four factors (if true 1, else 0) that compose the sixteen different cases: 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Training Status 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(Trained or not) 
Experience Under Fire 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
(Experienced or not) 
Protective Posture 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
(Protected or not) 
Distance from Impact 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
(Within effective range or not) 
The table below shows the probability of each response occurring given a specific case:  
Responses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Continue Msn 0.05 0.025 0.95 0.1 0.99 0.96 0.05 0.98 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.05 0.5 
(Stay in current posture) 
Run Away from Impact 0.05 0.025 0.025 0.1 0 0 0.05 0 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.05 0.2 0.3 
More Protected Posture 0.9 0.95 0.025 0.8 0.01 0 0.9 0 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.025 0.7 0.2 
Paralysis 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.02 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.025 0.05 0.1 
(Without the ability to move) 




thesis is on the individual entity, a more developed model for leader and unit 
reaction will be left for future research. 
 
Initial Model for Leader Reaction
Protected
Position
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V. COMBAT XXI 
A. OVERVIEW OF COMBAT XXI 
CXXI is a high-resolution, closed-form, stochastic, analytical combat 
simulation. [Ref 5]  It is being developed by the TRADOC Analysis Center – 
White Sands Missile Range (TRAC-WSMR) and the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC).  CXXI is a replacement for the Combined 
Arms and Task Force Evaluation Model (CASTFOREM). [Ref 5] 
TRAC-WSMR has identified a need to develop a react-to-indirect-fire 
capability.  This reaction to indirect fire can be implemented in the simulation 
using a set of behavior rules. 
B. IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL IN COMBAT XXI 
We met with the CXXI design team from White Sands Missile Range New 
Mexico.  The team consisted of Mr. Dave Durda, Major Sergio Posadas, and Dr. 
Imre Balogh.  Major Posadas is the Marine Corps Proponent for CXXI.  Dr. Imre 
Balogh is the sensor and move developer, and Mr. Dave Durda is the team 
leader. 
After discussing the thesis with the design team, two approaches were 
suggested. The first was to use the Behavioral language and to write rules to 
make the entities react to indirect fire.  The second approach was to modify the 
source code and in essence "hard-wire" in the desired behaviors.  After 
discussing both approaches with the design team, we decided that modifying the 
source code would be the most effective approach given the scope of the 
problem, the time requirements, and the infancy of the behavior language.  We 
had originally planned to use the behavioral language to write the behavioral 
rules, but we were unable to due to the limited functionality of the language at 
this point in its development process.  The behavioral language will be more 
usable in future versions of CXXI. 
As we approached the problem, we determined that we could not 
incorporate all of the many factors that contribute to an individual reaction to 
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indirect fire for several reasons.  CXXI, while still in the development stages, is 
currently not capable of modeling many of the factors we have identified as 
contributing to an individual's reaction.  With these limitations identified, we 
focused our effort on the two most significant factors that could be modeled in 
CXXI.  These factors are protective posture and perceived proximity to the 
impact.  These two factors will be used to determine how an individual entity 
reacts to indirect fire. 
1. Creating the Behavior 
We divided the problem into three areas: the code, the data, and the 
scenario.  We determined that we could modify the following classes: DMI 
(Decision Module Interface) Actions, Detection FM (Functionality Module), and 
Ground Impact Mediator in order to implement the behavior we wanted. 
Some important terms should be defined for our light infantry entities, 
referred to as Rangers.  The term posture refers to whether the entity is exposed 
or in a prone position.  The term cover means that the entity is in a covered 
position and his vulnerability to indirect fire is greatly decreased. 
We modeled the behavior as a function of two factors: posture and 
perceived distance from the impact.  Figure 5 is a graphic representation of the 
algorithm we developed to implement this behavior in CXXI.  Here is an 
explanation of Figure 5: 
· When an entity hears a detonation, it gets a perceived distance to 
that detonation.  Those perceived distances are broken down as a 
function of range into five categories: very close, close, near, 
nearby, and far. 
· If the perceived distance is closer than far, and the entity is not in a 
protective posture then assume a protective posture. 
· Otherwise, if the entity is not in a covered position and the 
perceived distance is less than far, assume a covered position. 
· There is no time component in this model.  Each entity reacts 
immediately upon hearing a detonation and stays in his new 
posture indefinitely. 
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Figure 5.   Flow Chart of Algorithm 
 
This behavior was implemented in the Combat XXI source code in the 
DMI Actions class.  The code in located in appendix B.  We added a loop to 
implement the logic of our behavior.  Figure 6 is an excerpt from that code: 
 
                 if( (! hasProtectedPosture) && (! isFar)) 
                 { 
                     thisDetDMI.setHasProtectedPosture(true); 
                 } 
                 else if( (! isCovered) && (! isFar)) 
                 { 
                     thisDetDMI.setIsCovered(true); 
                 } 
Figure 6.   Excerpt from DMI Actions Code 
 
2. The Data 
The data is a critical part of the model.  The data is formatted in a 
Microsoft Access database.  The table in Figure 7 shows the data for a high 
explosive (HE) artillery round fired against a specific target.  The target in this 
case is the Ranger entities we created. 
 





















tgt_dspsn tgt_mode tgt_state killcrit environment terrain pxla_1 
HD DEPLOYED SHIELDED K OPEN FLAT 30 
FE/STI DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED K OPEN FLAT 1000 
HD DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED K OPEN FLAT 500 
FE/STI DEPLOYED SHIELDED K OPEN FLAT 30 
FE/STI DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED M/F OPEN FLAT 1000 
HD DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED M/F OPEN FLAT 1000 
FE/STI DEPLOYED SHIELDED M/F OPEN FLAT 30 
HD DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED F OPEN FLAT 500 
HD DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED M OPEN FLAT 500 
FE/STI DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED M OPEN FLAT 1000 
HD DEPLOYED SHIELDED F OPEN FLAT 30 
FE/STI DEPLOYED SHIELDED F OPEN FLAT 30 
HD DEPLOYED SHIELDED M OPEN FLAT 30 
HD DEPLOYED SHIELDED M/F OPEN FLAT 30 
FE/STI DEPLOYED SHIELDED M OPEN FLAT 30 
FE/STI DEPLOYED UNSHIELDED F OPEN FLAT 1000 
Figure 7.   Data Summary for HE Fired at a Ranger Entity 
 
The first column, tgt_dspsn, describes the targets disposition.  The two 
types of target disposition are hull defilade (HD) and fully exposed/standing 
(FE/STI).  In terms of soldier entities, hull defilade is equivalent to the prone 
position.  The next column, tgt_mode, refers to the target mode, which was 
DEPLOYED for our entities.  The next column, tgt_state, has two settings 
SHIELDED and UNSHIELDED.  SHIELDED targets are less vulnerable to fire 
than are UNSHEILDED targets.  The column killcrit is the kill criteria.  There are 
four categories: K for catastrophic kill, M for mobility, F for firepower, and M/F for 
mobility and firepower.  For the next two columns, our Ranger entities were all in 
flat open terrain.  The final column, pxla_1, is the most significant.  This column 
lists the lethal area for a proximity fuse fired at one third or less of the max range.  
There are additional columns that list similar data for a point detonating fuse and 
for two thirds and max range.  For our scenario we were only concerned with the 
columns shown in Figure 7. 
We also had to create an entity that we could use in our scenario.  We 
started with all the base settings for a light infantry entity from the CXXI database 
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and modified his title.  This gave us a unique entity that we could change freely 
without affecting any of the core CXXI entities. 
Since we were firing at a newly created entity, we had to populate the data 
table for the specific weapon we were going to use.  In our scenario, we are firing 
M198 howitzers at Ranger entities. 
In choosing factors that could be modeled, we had to choose factors that 
corresponded to data available.  In this case, the factor of posture relates directly 
to the data.  Each entity includes input data that states his posture as shown in 
the first column, tgt_dspsn, and the third column, tgt_state, of Figure 7. 
3. The Scenario 
For the scenario, we chose flat open terrain.  The Blue force consists of a 
light infantry platoon of 36 men.  The platoon has occupied a triangular shaped 
assembly area to prepare for future combat operations.  All soldiers are standing 
or kneeling while they are executing their priorities of work.  Hasty fighting 





Figure 8.   Blue Force Disposition 
 
The red force consists of a nine-gun howitzer battery with three Fire 
Direction Centers.  The battery has occupied a firing position and each section of 
three guns is laid on a point target within the Blue assembly area.  Each gun will 
fire 10 rounds.  Figure 9 shows the Red force disposition. 
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Figure 9.   Red Force Disposition 
 
4. Measures of Effectiveness 
With the objective of the operational mission being to prepare for future 
combat operations and maintain/build combat power, we decided that the 
number of kills inflicted by indirect fire was the best measure of effectiveness.  
We collected the number of kills for both the base case (no behavior rule) and 
the alternative case (with the behavior rule) for comparison.  CXXI currently only 
has K-kill (catastrophic kill) capability fully functional.  Future versions with have 
mobility, firepower, and communication kills capability.  Figure 10 shows indirect 
fire rounds impacting in the Blue assembly area.  An "x" is placed over an entity 




Figure 10.   Rounds Impacting in Blue Assembly Area 
 
5. Entity Reactions 
In the alternative case the entity reactions are realistic.  When an entity 
senses an impact, it executes the individual common task react-to-indirect-fire, 
which is to assume a prone position.  If the entity is already in the prone position, 
then it assumes a covered position.  These actions are more realistic than the 
base case in which the entities had no reaction at all to the indirect fire.  The 
amount of time an entity stays in the new state is a topic for future research. 
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VI. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
To assess the impact of the new algorithm, we decided to conduct several 
runs of both the base case and the alternative case.  We conducted five base 
case runs and five alternative runs. 
B. BASE CASE (NO REACTION TO INDIRECT FIRE) 
For the base case, there are no "react to indirect fire" behaviors in place.  
The blue force consists of a light infantry platoon of 36 men.  The platoon has 
occupied a triangular shaped assembly area to prepare for future combat 
operations.  All soldiers are standing or kneeling while they are executing their 
priorities of work.  Hasty fighting positions have been dug to provide cover. 
The red force consists of a howitzer battery with nine guns and a Fire 
Direction Center for each of the three sections.  The battery has occupied a firing 
position and each section of three guns is laid on a point target within the blue 
assembly area.  Each gun fires 10 rounds over a 20-minute period. 
C. ALTERNATIVE (REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE BEHAVIOR IN USE) 
For the alternative case, the react to indirect fire behavior rules are in 
place.  The scenario has not changed from the base case expect that the 
behavior rules are in use. 
D. VERIFING THE BEHAVIOR 
To verify that each entity was executing the proper behavior, we created 
an output file to keep track of critical information.  Figure 11 shows how entity 
Ranger 9 executed the behavior.  Ranger 9's initial posture was not protected 
and not covered.  After hearing a detonation that he perceived as near, his new 






DMI Actions... DETONATION HEARD for: 
Ranger1_4/RANGER_9 
Type: RANGER  ID: 508 
Unit: BLUE SQUAD Ranger1_4 ID: 475 
is entity in protected posture?: false 
is entity covered?: false detdist NEAR 
New protected posture: true 
New covered: false 
Figure 11.   Output File for Ranger 9 First Detonation 
 
Figure 12 shows that Ranger 9 heard a second detonation, also perceived 
as near, and changed to a covered position. 
 
DMI Actions... DETONATION HEARD for: 
Ranger1_4/RANGER_9 
Type: RANGER  ID: 508 
Unit: BLUE SQUAD Ranger1_4 ID: 475  
is entity in protected posture?: true 
is entity covered?: false detdist NEAR 
New protected posture: true 
New covered: true 
Figure 12.   Output File for Ranger 9 Second Detonation 
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VII. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
We divided our data analysis into three parts: a two-sample t-test, a Mann-
Whitney test, and a two-way analysis of variance.  The t-test was chosen to 
determine if the difference between the base case average number of kills and 
the alternative case average number of kills was statistically significant.  We 
conducted a total of ten runs, including five runs without the behavior (base case) 
and five runs with the behavior (alternative).  With a small sample size, the 
assumption of normality was suspect.  Therefore we also chose a nonparametric 
alternative to the two-sample t-test, the Mann-Whitney test.  We conducted an 
additional twenty runs varying the intensity of fire for the two-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA).  The ANOVA was used to show the effect that varying the 
intensity of fire would have on each case. 
B. TWO-SAMPLE T-TEST 
We gathered our data from each of the runs and input it into Minitab. [Ref 
14]  Our null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the mean number 
of kills.  Our alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference between the mean 












1. Data Collected 
For each run we collected the number of kills.  Table 1 shows the data 
collected.  In order to use the t-test we assumed the data was normally 
distributed.  We also assumed the variances to be equal. [Ref 15] 






Table 1.   Data Collection Table 
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2. Key Findings 
We found that the difference between the average number of kills was 
both statistically significant and militarily significant.  Figure 13 is the Minitab 
output for the two-sample t-test with a 95% confidence interval.  With a p-value of 
zero, there is essentially no chance that we would see such an extreme value for 
the test statistic (11.84) if the null hypothesis is true. 
 
Two-Sample T-Test and CI: Base Case, Alternative 
 
Two-sample T for Base Case Number of Kills vs Alternative Number of Kills 
 
                  N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Base Case Number  5  15.60   2.07     0.93 
Alternative Numb  5  4.000  0.707     0.32 
 
 
Difference = mu (Base Case Number of Kills) - mu (Alternative Number of Kills) 
Estimate for difference:  11.6000 
95% CI for difference:  (8.8797, 14.3203) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 11.84  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 4 
 
Figure 13.   Two-Sample T-Test 
 
The box plot in Figure 14 graphically shows that the difference between 
the sample distribution of the number of kills (the mean is indicated by the plus 
sign in a circle) in the base case and the sample distribution of the number of kills 
in the alternative case is quite clear.  Specifically, all of the responses for the 
alternative case are less that the smallest response in the base case, further 
indicating a significant difference in the two settings. 
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Figure 14.   Box Plot  
 
C. MANN-WHITNEY TEST 
With a small sample size, the assumption of normality is a concern.  To 
counter this, we chose the Mann-Whitney test.  The Mann-Whitney test performs 
a hypothesis test of the equality of two population medians and calculates the 
corresponding point estimate and confidence interval. This test was used as a 
nonparametric alternative to the 2-sample t-test, and requires no assumption of 
normality. [Ref 15]  An assumption for the Mann-Whitney test is that the data are 
independent random samples from two populations with the same shape and 
equal variances, and a scale that is continuous or ordinal (possesses natural 
ordering) if discrete. [Ref 14]  The Mann-Whitney test is also known as the two-



















Boxplot of Base Case Number of Kills, Alternative Number of Kills
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1. Data Collected 
For this test we used the same ten data points as used in the two-sample 
t-test found in Table 1. 
2. Key Findings 
 
Mann-Whitney Test and CI: Alt, Base  
 
      N  Median 
Base  5  15.000 
Alt   5   4.000 
 
 
Point estimate for ETA1-ETA2 is 11.000 
96.3 Percent CI for ETA1-ETA2 is (9.999,14.999) 
W = 15.0 
Test of ETA1 = ETA2 vs ETA1 not = ETA2 is significant at 0.0122 
The test is significant at 0.0109 (adjusted for ties) 
 
Figure 15.   Mann-Whitney Test and CI 
 
We used Minitab to calculate the results of the Mann-Whitney Test, see 
Figure 15.  The sample medians of the ordered data are 15.0 and 4.0. The 
96.3% confidence interval for the difference in population medians (ETA1-ETA2) 
is [9.9 to 14.9], which does not include zero indicating a statistically significant 
difference between the medians.  The test statistic W = 15 has a p-value of 
0.0122 or 0.0109 when adjusted for ties.  This is the lowest possible p-value for 
this test using only five samples from each population.  Since the p-value is less 
than the chosen alpha level of 0.05, we concluded that there is sufficient 
evidence to reject H0.  Therefore, the data supports the hypothesis that there is a 
difference between the population medians. 
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D. TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to investigate and model the 
relationship between a response variable and one or more independent 
variables. In analysis of variance, the independent variables are qualitative 
(categorical), and no assumption is made about the nature of the relationship 
(that is, the model does not include coefficients for variables). In effect, analysis 
of variance extends the two-sample t-test for testing the equality of two 
population means to a more general null hypothesis of comparing the equality of 
more than two means, versus them not all being equal. [Ref 14] 
After analyzing the data from the first ten runs, we decided to determine 
what effect the intensity of fire would have on the number of kills for each case.  
A two-way analysis of variance tests the equality of population means when 
classification of treatments is by two variables or factors. [Ref 14]  Therefore, our 
two variables are case and intensity of fire.  Using the ten initial runs as the low 
intensity with 90 rounds fired in 20-minutes, we increased the number of rounds 
to 180 for medium intensity, and to 270 for high intensity.  Table 2 summarizes 
the ANOVA factors and levels. 
 
Intensity/Case Base Case Alternative Case 
High 5 5 
Medium 5 5 
Low 5 5 
Table 2.   Number of Runs by Case and Intensity 
 
An assumption of the ANOVA is that the random amount by which 
observed value differs from its expectation (residual) is assumed to be normal 
and independent with a common variance. [Ref 15]  These assumptions appear 
reasonable based on the normal probability plot in Figure 16 showing that the 
residuals fall very close to or on the line, and the residual plot in Figure 17 























Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals
(response is Kills)
 















Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
(response is Kills)
 
Figure 17.   Residuals Versus the Fitted Values 
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1. Data Collected 
Appendix A shows the data collected for all thirty runs broken down by 
case and intensity. 
2. Key Findings 
Figure 18 is a scatter plot of the number of kills for each run.  Runs 1 
through 15 are the base case and runs 16 through 30 are the alternative.  An 
examination of this plot reveals that in the base case, the rate at which the 
average number of kills increases is greater than in the alternative case.  This is 
significant and it supports our intuition that entities without the behavior in place 
would be killed at a higher rate than those with the behavior in place.  In the base 
case, the number of kills increased rapidly as the intensity increased, eventually 
reaching a state in which all 36 entities would be killed.  In the alternative case, 
however, the number of kills increases more gradually and would eventually 
reach the same state but at a much slower rate.  These results were in keeping 
with our intuition on both cases. 























From our two-way ANOVA, we found that intensity, case, and interaction 
were all significant factors.  Figure 19 shows the Minitab output of the two-way 
ANOVA for kills versus intensity and case.  Case is the most important factor by 
far, with respect to explaining the variance in kills, as seen in the comparison of 
the relative sizes of the sum of squares (SS) of Case, SS Intensity, and SS 
Interaction. 
 
Two-way ANOVA: Kills versus Intensity, Case  
 
Source       DF       SS       MS       F      P 
Intensity     2   671.67   335.83   77.50  0.000 
Case          1  2520.83  2520.83  581.73  0.000 
Interaction   2   170.47    85.23   19.67  0.000 
Error        24   104.00     4.33 
Total        29  3466.97 
 
S = 2.082   R-Sq = 97.00%   R-Sq(adj) = 96.38% 
 
 
                 Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                 Pooled StDev 
Intensity  Mean  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
high       21.3                               (--*---) 
low         9.8  (---*--) 
med        16.8                    (--*--) 
                 ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                       12.0      16.0      20.0      24.0 
 
 
               Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
               Pooled StDev 
Case     Mean   -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
alt    6.8000   (-*-) 
base  25.1333                                  (-*-) 
                -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
               6.0      12.0      18.0      24.0 
 
Figure 19.   Two-way ANOVA: Kills versus Intensity, Case 
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Graphic output from our two-way ANOVA produced the main effects plot 
in Figure 20.  From this plot it is clear that both case and intensity are significant 
















3 High2 Medium1 Low
Case Intensity
Main Effects Plot (data means) for Kills
 
Figure 20.   Main Effects Plot for Kills 
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Figure 21 shows the interaction plot among the factors of case and 
intensity.  An interaction between factors occurs when the change in response 
from the low level to the high level of one factor is not the same as the change in 
response at the same two levels of a second factor. That is, the effect of one 
factor is dependent upon a second factor. We can compare the relative strength 
of the effects across factors. [Ref 14]  Although intensity, case, and interaction 
were all significant factors, case was much more significant as evident by the 
largest Sum of Square of 2520.83, as described in Figure 19. 
Case
Intensity

















Interaction Plot (data means) for Kills
 




VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
A. FACE VALIDATION 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the model, we used the face 
validation method.  The office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for 
Operations Research defines face validation as: 
…the process of determining whether an M&S, on the surface, 
seems reasonable to personnel who are knowledgeable about 
the system or phenomena under study [Ref 2] 
Using this definition, we have determined that the behavior rules 
implemented in CXXI seem reasonable and meet the requirements for face 
validation. 
B. SUMMARY 
From the literature review, we determined both doctrinally how soldiers 
should react, and historically how soldiers have reacted to indirect fire.  We then 
developed a general model from selected input factors and reactions.  Using that 
model as a framework, we took the two most significant factors that could be 
implemented in CXXI, protective posture and perceived distance from impact, 
and developed a set of behavior rules.  These behavior rules were implemented 
in the CXXI source code.  We next modified the database for our entities and 
weapons system characteristics.  With the behavior coded and databases 
updated, we develop a scenario that allowed us to do a face validation and 
determined that the rules were working in a realistic manner.  We determined 
that the entity reactions are more realistic with the rules in place.  From our data 
analysis consisting of a two-sample t-test, a Mann-Whitney test, and an ANOVA, 
we concluded that the difference in the average number of kills between the base 
case without the behavior rule and the alternative was both statistically and 
military significant.  The model implemented through the use of the behavior 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several areas and aspects related to this topic that could be 
developed for future research.  As CXXI completes its development, the 
behavioral language will continue to grow in capability.  As it grows, it will 
become easier for users to develop their own behavior rules without modifying 
any source code.  Future research should take the factors that influence the 
leader's reaction and develop leader behavior rules for react-to-indirect-fire.  As 
the level of resolution continues to increase in future simulation s, the 
implementation of the model could be more detailed and include more of the 
input factors.  Future research in this area should address suppression of the 
entity as a result of indirect fire. The amount of time an entity stays in the new 
state is also a topic for future research.  Future researchers could change the 




APPENDIX A. DATA 
This appendix contains the data for all thirty runs that were conducted. 
 
Run Case Intensity Kills 
1 base low 14 
2 base low 14 
3 base low 15 
4 base low 16 
5 base low 19 
6 base med 29 
7 base med 25 
8 base med 29 
9 base med 28 
10 base med 28 
11 base high 32 
12 base high 32 
13 base high 30 
14 base high 33 
15 base high 33 
16 alt low 4 
17 alt low 5 
18 alt low 3 
19 alt low 4 
20 alt low 4 
21 alt med 5 
22 alt med 6 
23 alt med 4 
24 alt med 9 
25 alt med 5 
26 alt high 11 
27 alt high 6 
28 alt high 15 
29 alt high 8 
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APPENDIX B. MODIFICATIONS TO CXXI SOURCE CODE 
1. DMI ACTIONS 
We modified this class in order to implement our react to indirect fire 
behavior.  The DMI Actions class defines all tactical actions used by the CXXI 
core model DMI's.  DMI Actions for each functionality are maintained in this 
class. This class is used for typical CXXI entities only.  Certain assumptions are 
made about typical CXXI entities.  The assumptions for the 'typical' CXXI entity 
are:  
· It is a military platform 
· It exists in a tactical environment which involves tactical units and a 
force hierarchy 
· It is part of a unit and has a chain of command 
The original author of this class is Dr. Imre Balogh.  This is the block of 
Java code that was added to the CXXI core model DMI Actions Class. 
           //For Brent Streater's Thesis 
           //DETECTION HEARD EVENT 
            else if (aSimEventName.equals("doDetonationHeard"))  
            { 
              if(false) 
              { 
                PerceivedDistance detDist  =  
                ((PerceivedDistance)((SimEvent)aSimEvent).getParameters()[0]); 
                 
                boolean isVeryClose = false; 
                boolean isClose = false; 
                boolean isNear = false; 
                boolean isNearBy = false; 
                boolean isFar = false; 
                 
                if(detDist == PerceivedDistance.VERY_CLOSE) 
                { 
                    isVeryClose = true; 
                } 
                else if (detDist == PerceivedDistance.CLOSE) 
                { 
                    isClose = true; 
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                } 
                else if (detDist == PerceivedDistance.NEAR) 
                { 
                    isNear = true; 
                } 
                else if (detDist == PerceivedDistance.NEAR_BY) 
                { 
                    isNearBy = true; 
                } 
                else isFar = true; 
                 
                PerceivedDirection detDir  =  
                ((PerceivedDirection)((SimEvent)aSimEvent).getParameters()[1]);   
                 
                boolean isCovered = thisDetDMI.isCovered(); 
                boolean hasProtectedPosture = thisDetDMI.hasProtectedPosture(); 
                 System.out.println("\nDMI Actions... DETONATION HEARD for:"+ 
                  "\n"+thisEntity.getDescription()+ 
                  "\nis entity in protected posture?: "+ hasProtectedPosture+ 
                  "\nis entity covered?: "+ isCovered +  " detdist " +detDist); 
                 if( (! hasProtectedPosture) && (! isFar)) 
                 { 
                     thisDetDMI.setHasProtectedPosture(true); 
                 } 
                 else if( (! isCovered) && (! isFar)) 
                 { 
                     thisDetDMI.setIsCovered(true); 
                 } 
                   System.out.println( 
                  "\nNew protected posture: "+  thisDetDMI.hasProtectedPosture()+ 
                  "\nNew covered: "+  thisDetDMI.isCovered()); 
              } 
            } 
            //NOT A VALID EVENT NAME 
            else throw new InvalidSimEventNameException( 
            "\nInvalid SimEvent Name!"+ 
            "\nThe name passed to Air Move Actions: " + aSimEventName); 
        }//try 
        catch(InvalidSimEventNameException e) { 
            System.out.println(e.getMessage()); 
            System.exit(0); 
        }//catch 
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2. GROUND IMPACT MEDIATOR CLASS 
This class handles the impact of munitions on ground entities.  Impacts of 
Direct Fire munitions are handled differently than Indirect Fire munitions since 
Direct Fire munitions generally have a specific target associated with them.  The 
target is retrieved from the Engagement Object and the mediator calls routines 
that compute the impact point on the target.  For Indirect Fire munitions, the play 
board is consulted to find the entities that are within the influence of the 
munitions.  Following the assessment of which target or targets are impacted, the 
appropriate information is then passed to the Damage Mediator class to actually 
determine the damage that occurred.  The Damage Mediator class then passes 
the Damage State Vector to the entity in question to perform damage to itself.  
The original author of this class is David R. Durda. 
This is the block of code that was added to the ground impact mediator 
class starting at line 646. 
// GroundImpactMediator class 
 
//For Brent Streater's Thesis                     
//                       adjustExposureParams(potentialTarget); 
 
                       ///Go to damage mediator to determine the damage... 
                       DamageMediatorIDF.assessIDFDamageToEntity(potentialTarget,  
                                                     anEngagementObject); 
                     
                    if (logger.isLoggingEnabled(DAMAGE_LOGPROPERTY)) 
                    { 
                        String msg = Schedule.getSimTimeStr()+":" 
                        +potentialTarget.getID()+":" 
                        +potentialTarget.getAssignedName()+":" 
                        +anEngagementObject.hashCode()+"," 
                        +"K-Kill"; 
                        logger.log(DAMAGE_LOGPROPERTY, msg, 1); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        else  // target list is empty 
        { 
            if(debug) 
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                System.err.println( "No targets found near impact location!"); 
        } 
    }  // end if eventName == IDFAssessImpact 
 
 
3. DETECTION FM CLASS 
The following code is for perceived distance.  It is from Detection FM 
class.  The entity is informed that a sonic event has occurred in its vicinity.  This 
method should be called whenever an explosion occurs.  This method causes 
this FM to schedule a "detonation heard" event to be scheduled with a time delay 
of zero.  The input parameters should be modified based on the capabilities of 
the entity before the information is passed on to the DMI. 
     * @param location the location of where the explosion occurred 
     */ 
    public void detonationHeard(Location location); 
     
     public void detonationHeard(Location aLocation) 
     {          
         Location myLocation = myPhysicalEntity.getCxxiWorldLocation(); 
         // compute the distance to the detonation 
         double dist = myLocation.distanceTo(aLocation).getMeters(); 
         PerceivedDistance perceivedDist; 
         if (dist < 25.0) 
             perceivedDist = PerceivedDistance.VERY_CLOSE; 
         else if (dist < 50.0) 
             perceivedDist = PerceivedDistance.CLOSE; 
         else if (dist < 150.0) 
             perceivedDist = PerceivedDistance.NEAR; 
         else if (dist < 200.0) 
             perceivedDist = PerceivedDistance.NEAR_BY; 
         else 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Rand Corp, FAST-VAL: Relationships Among Casualties, Suppression, 
and the Performance of Company-Sized Units, Santo Monica, CA, March 1970. 
2. Sergio Posadas and Eugene P. Paulo, Stochastic Simulation Of A 
Commander’s Decision Cycle, Military Operations Research Volume 8 Number 2 
2003. 
3. Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Instant Lessons of the Iraq War, 21 July 2003; available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons.pdf, December 2004. 
4. 3rd Infantry After Action Review, Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003; 
available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf, 
December 2004. 
5. US Army TRADOC Analysis Center-WSMR, COMBAT XXI Users Manual 
Version 3.5, White Sands Missile Range, NM, June 2003. 
6. Thomas A. Kolditz, Modern Tactics in the Moral Domain: Smart Weapons 
and the Production of the Combat Stress Reaction, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 
December 1992. 
7. Marshall, S.L.A, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command In 
Future War, Alexandria, VA, 1947. 
8. Shultz, Duanne P., Panic in the Military, University of North Carolina, 
Charlotte, NC, 1971. 
9. Shalev, Arieh Y., & Munitz, Hanan, Psychiatric Care of Acute Stress 
Reactions to Military Threat, Paper presented at the International Conference on 
Combat Psychiatry. Washington, D.C.: Walter Reed Army Institute of Reseach, 
1987. 
10. Headquarter Department of the US Army, Soldiers Manual of Common 
Tasks Skill Level 1 STP 21-1-SMCT, October 2001. 
11. Headquarter Department of the US Army, FM 7-8 Infantry Platoon and 
Squad, Washington D.C., April 1992. 
48 
12. bmh.com, React to Indirect Fire STX Training Plan. available from World 
Wide Web @ http://www.bmh.com/ARPA/MCCFOR/STX1-3/TA9RIF.html, 
December 2004. 
13. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 2001 (As Amended Through 
September 2003). 
14. Minitab Inc., Minitab Release 14.1 Statistical Software, 1972 - 2003. 
15. Devore, Jay L., Probability and Statistics for Engineering and the 
Sciences, 5th Edition, 2000. 
16. Wittwer, Nick, FY04 Project Implementation Plan for the Individual 
Combatant Master Thesis Project, TRADOC Analysis Center Monterey, CA, 
November 2003. 
 
17. Gal, Reuven and Dayan, Hava, The Psychological Effects of Intense 
Artillery Bombardment: The Israeli Experience in the Yom-Kippur War (1973), 
Fort Detrick, MA, May 1992. 
49 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. LTC Gene Paulo 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. Professor Tom Lucas 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. MAJ Nick Wittwer 
TRADOC Analysis Center Monterey 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Dave Durda 
TRADOC Analysis Center White Sands 
 White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 
 
